# 1AC

#### This year presents a continuing chapter in the humanism legacy. The hero figures of capitalism cannot be divorced from the history of antitrust. This archetype is the cultivation of phase-shifts strewn through the history of Anthropos.

#### *Man1[[1]](#footnote-1)* cloaks itself in the veil of theologia. This is the division between spirit/flesh, "good" and "evil" where the "pure" clerical ethnoclass became elevated over their "heretical" counterparts who "lack a taste for the divine". This text stood at the beginning foundations for the "holy" crusades, and colonial "civilizing missions".

#### Man 2 organized "Man" through the advent of biological readings of the body- Darwinian readings of "fitness" were subsumed at the new center of the European rational subject. They appeared at the height of "genetic selection". This genetic hierarchy left black and indigenous folk in the undesirable categories- cast as scum at the bottom of the political system.

#### These iterations of men cultivate in the "hero figure" – going by the name of *homo oeconomicus.* This hero figure has been saturated by the previous iterations of man and seeps into this year’s resolution. The Hero Figure of *homo oeconomicus* are the prime wielders of the capitalist state. They are white, male, Christian, economically stable who utilize the capitalist state for wealth accumulation.

#### Antitrust is the final iteration of homo oeconomicus. It reverts the market back to its origin form with pure and unfaltering competition. This reversion is the prime state of the market where in homo oeconomicus have no excuse not to become part of the market because we have economic freedom. Antitrust rewrites the code of human life. Now, capital is the new blood that gives life to mere bodies

McKittrick 2015 (Katherine McKittrick – Professor in Gender Studies and the Graduate Program in Cultural Studies, Black Studies, Cultural Geographies, The Arts (music, fiction, poetry, visual art), Theories of Race, and Interdisciplinarity at University of Queens. “Sylvia Wynter: On Being Human as a Praxis”, Duke University Press, pp. 9-10 [starting at “This conversation should be read with Wynter’s …” to “lives of all humans are increasingly subordinated to a figure that thrives on accumulation.”] – ERW/BEH)

#### The resolution situates itself within the realm of rationality. The economy is not an ahistorical development, it is development of Darwinism reading of fitness. It assumes prime wielder of reason who can shape the economic sphere in their own vision.

Hantel 20 (Max Hantel- Assistant professor of Women’s and Gender studies at Rutgers University, *“Placisity and Fungibility On Sylvia Wynter’s Pieza Framework”,* Duke University Press, PP. 111-113). file:///C:/Users/peter/Dropbox/My%20PC%20(DESKTOP-DB7FRFG)/Downloads/Plasticity\_and\_Fungibility\_On\_Sylvia\_Wyn.pdf

In The Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault describes the movement from classical liberal economics to neoliberal economics in postwar Europe and the shift to a US-led consensus. The development of **homo economicus** recalibrates the population biopolitics of the nineteenth and early twentieth century around the individual as economic actor who defines **(evolutionary)** success in terms of efficient optimization and material accumulation. The new political rationality Foucault describes goes beyond a set of economic reforms and instantiates a new triangulation of the economy, the state, and its citizens. As Wendy Brown summarizes the mutation, “Neoliberalism does not conceive of either the market itself or rational economic behavior as purely **natural.** Both are constructed—organized by law and political institutions, and requiring political intervention and **orchestration.**”50 Free subjects of classical economics demand only the negative freedom of nonintervention to successfully pursue their naturally occurring greed; the aggregate of individuals left alone in such a way achieves the optimal conditions of the invisible hand of the market. Neoliberal politics traffics in much of the same language of classical economics but sees a properly **entrepreneurial** citizen-**subject** **as something to be fostered across all spheres of human activity,** such that traditional divisions between economic and noneconomic aspects of life dissolve. **Homo economicus,** the neoliberal subject par excellence, **brings economic optimization to bear on everything from sex and kinship to recreation and exercise through tactics of marginal efficiency gain consistently inscribed across discursive formations of subjunctivization,** including the family, psychology, criminal justice, the classroom, and the university, along with new developments in digital technology and social media. These tactics all intertwine through strategic material accumulation above all else. **The state serves as** but **one more economic actor**, leaving self-regulation as fostered by different spheres of neoliberal subjunctivization to citizens **rendered as entrepreneurs of consumption.** That is, **they accumulate wealth in** the register of **tactical consumption that further** optimizes their good moral **standing as economic successes.** In Wynter’s terms, material accumulation becomes the crucial measure of one’s humanity under the conditions of Man2. One way of describing this interface of accumulation and measurement is what Gilles Deleuze calls the development of the “control society,” in which the individual of classical liberalism is disaggregated and recomposed as a “dividual.”51 The dividual emerges from manifold statistical tools for capturing the body’s capacities and predictively shaping the translation of the virtual into the actual. **One cannot formally describe the dividual in the abstract because it is a precise data point across all its measurable connections to demographic ranges, with specific intersections of data streams given political meanings at different moments.** One can certainly imagine, however, a decidualized subject composition emerging from various measurements: spatial mobilities, monetary transactions, medical risk profiles, education background, earning potential, quantitative ideological beliefs, security challenges—the list could go on indefinitely, and indeed, the dream of control society is exactly to make such a list endlessly flexible and totalizing such that no aspect of escapes capture. This phase of **capitalism is “no longer directed toward production but toward products**, that is, toward sales or markets.”52 What I want to suggest is that the historical development Deleuze describes is best understood in relationship to Wynter’s parallel elaboration of the pieza framework and its refiguration from the enslaved body to the laboring body to the consuming body. The control society’s simultaneous creation and targeting of the dividual, based on a shift from production to products, is most intimately associated with the creation of market profiles based on the quantification of every aspect of life and its monetization (that is, identifying virtual sources of profit and inventing concepts and technologies that actualize the movement of capital). It is, in other words, **a subjectivization** primarily through consumption, **recasting other functions of sovereign governance** like social welfare or security and policing through the metrics of privatization and optimal choice. Hence, Deleuze acknowledges but leaves tellingly unanalyzed the uneven geographies of control, cautioning against an overgeneralization of the dividual as a mode of subjunctivization or a clean narrative of progression from sovereign power and biopower: “One thing, it’s true, hasn’t changed—capitalism still keeps three quarters of humanity in extreme poverty, too poor to have debts and too numerous to be confined: control will have to deal not only with vanishing frontiers, but with mushrooming shantytowns and ghettos.”53 **To route this challenge through Wynter’s work, the question is how to link the** emergence of control societies as a **specific technology of Man2** (reifying and **targeting populations considered human under neoliberal regimes** of accumulation) to the great majority of the world systematically negated by their lack of a relevant market profile. **As Doreen Massey puts it** in her study of refugees, the working class, and urban slums, “At one level they have been tremendous co**ntributors to what we call time-space compression; and at another level they are imprisoned by it.**”54 Deploying Wynter’s pieza framework here recasts the consumer, structurally parallel to the figure of the dividual, **as the source of extractive value under neoliberal capitalism in a manner contingent on the earlier production of the enslaved body and so always already racialized in the global sense of Man2, but not reducible to race alone.**

#### Competition has become the bar in which people obtain their right to life. Competition law is a regulator of interpersonal behavior and maximizing the potential profit to obtain the “good life”. Welcome to the world of the liberal market- we are given life and given death by market.

Turmus 11 (Ezgi Turmus, professor of social sciences at Istanbul University Social Sciences Institute Social Structure Social Change Department, Law of Competition Effect on Enterprise Freedom: Vertical Switches in Turkey)

Law is a set of rules that contain the power of state authority behind it. The individuals who make up the society have their **rights superior to themselves for the need for protection.** It has paved the way for the institutionalization of justice by transferring it to an **authority.** Other Like institutions, the legal institution is “ stable (but not stable) for human interaction. It reduces uncertainty by establishing a structure (which is not necessarily efficient). ” 15 As a social institution, law regulates the order of society within the framework of certain rules. It exists to provide justice and to meet the need for justice, and there is **social interaction.** shows its presence everywhere. Competition, which spreads to all areas of social life, is within the scope of law. In order for people to reach their intended position in the order in which they live, and It can be considered as a right to freely obtain the tools that it can be used for A person is to reveal his full potential while using his own abilities and to do this. has the right to develop by competing with the potentials of other individuals. 16 This is the **competition** In this sense, it **is directly related to the right to life of the person** and is considered as a right. should be identifiable. The emergence of competition as a branch of law really **took place in the USA in 1890.** with the Sherman law. But before that, the first It is stated that the laws were seen in Babylon 4000 years ago. 17 Also Old In Greece and India, BC. 50 years of laws regulating competition and the first law against monopolies in the modern sense was enacted in England in 1624. It is the Statute of Monopoly. 18 The USA lost the legal and economic independence of businesses and It is the country where the trust structure, under which they continue their production, first emerged. The effect of the trusts in the country was later changed by the antitrust laws in another way. In other words, it gave rise to Sherman's Law. generally monopolies, collusion, which are in the regulatory field of competition law. and mergers constitute the main focal points of the administrative authority in the law-making process. they form. In the emergence of all these as a branch of law, legitimacy, restricting or limiting the rights of others due to its destructive properties. Free market mechanism to provide the **highest level of welfare must maintain its competitive environment. But the free market mechanism** must also operate in a way that may weaken the competitive process **and in this case a protection mechanism is needed.** This shield of protection ensures that competition is legally enforced. can be achieved through regulation. 19 According to Adam Smith, free on the market There may be some situations that prevent the emergence of competitive price. Of these most importantly, **between enterprises (are) regulated by competition law. is cooperation.** This is why Smith favors the total liberation of enterprises. and emphasizes the need for the state to undertake a task in this regard. Hence Smith's views are important in the process leading up to today's competition law. can be said. property, inheritance, work and rights such as freedom of contract, freedom to establish private enterprise, right to competition is sending. In addition, in Article 167 of the Constitution, “The state ensures that money, credit, capital, goods and services markets are healthy and orderly. takes measures to ensure and improve its functioning; actual and contractual results in the markets It prevents the monopolization and cartelization that will arise ” 21 , this prevention will be used in the future. with the law-making process, which will determine the limits and rules of its activity. has resulted. In short, this clear duty given to the state in the constitution is competitive today. to embod(ies) itself through the regulation of law. Competition law does not directly **protect the interests of individuals.** concerned with the public interest. The state has this duty, which is also stated in the constitution. using it on the basis of its own sovereignty and thus maintaining public order. aims to. In this sense, competition law both in terms of its purpose and seems closer to public law in terms of the tools it uses. 22 The regulation area of ​​competition law is the public interest we mentioned above. due to its purpose, from unfair competition, which is the regulation of Turkish Commercial Law. are separated. Because unfair competition regulation, unfair competition between traders (and) tasks such as preventing behavior, protecting the trader against malicious activities and these falls(s)within the scope of interpersonal law. 2

#### The continual interaction with the market has been framed as a route to liberation. As Sylvia Wynter Reminds us “No longer be a native but come and be Man like us! Become homo oeconomicus! While the only way we could, they further told us, become un- underdeveloped, was by following the plans of both their and our economists.” This reiterates the liberal narrative of calculative rationality.

**Winnubst 19**, Chair and Professor of Women’s, Gender & Sexuality Studies at Ohio State University. (Shannon, 12-15-2019, “The many lives of fungibility: anti-blackness in neoliberal times”, *Journal of Gender Studies*, pg. 108-109, DOI: 10.1080/09589236.2019.1692193) Thanks Azja and Graham

From the perspective of the anti-black ontology that frames liberalism, modernity and global capitalism, this attachment of economic abstraction to the projects of self-making is already a racializing phenomenon. From a strictly ontological perspective, **only white bodies** and **lives** have been granted **proprietary access** to the **freedoms of the market** that are exacerbating into **subjective mechanisms in neoliberalism**. **Violently abstracted** into **commodities** and **capital from the outset**, black bodies are positioned **ontologically** as **external** to the **market rationalities** that **intensify in the neoliberal episteme**: black bodies remain **objects**, not **subjects**, of the **market** and its **calculations**. Despite the **rhetoric of colour-blindness** and the logic of **equivocation** between social differences that would erase it, this **ontological iteration of fungibility** as the **foundational** violence of antiblackness **remains intact** in the neoliberal episteme. Consequently, as the modes of subjectivity transform from the classically liberal model of rights-bearing interiority into maximizing circuits-of-interests, the foundational violence of anti-blackness persists, even as the abstraction from its historical markers intensifies. These processes of internalizing neoliberal fungibility as a mechanism of subjectivity are, therefore, already racialized – that is, they track and signify differently according to different racialized situatedness in the colonial ontology of anti-blackness.

Returning to Foucault’s accounts of neoliberalism as the birth-site of biopolitics, I expand on this reading of **biopolitical normalization** that is rooted precisely in this **abstraction of** the **market rationality**. In Sleights of Reason, Mary Beth Mader argues that the unique epistemology of biopolitical normalization is not the gradual homogenization of cultural forms and values around particular nodes (medical, legal, familial, sexual, and so on), but the **ascendancy** of a **numerical standardization** of objects. More incisively, Mader isolates the specific logic of biopolitical normalization in the immanently self-referential work of a statistical norm, wherein the logic of the ratio **locks** the abstraction performed by numbers into a **self-enclosed system of referentiality**. The exemplar of this, for Mader, is the use of suicide rates: ‘the expression suicide rates no longer refers to any **person** or **persons** but to a relation between **numbers** and **quantities alone**’ (Mader, 2012, p. 56). This **sealing of referentiality** from any object or phenomenon beyond the numerical **intensifies the abstraction** already enacted by the numerical form into an enclosed system of meaning. The move from individual to rate, that is, further abstracts the issue at hand (for example, suicide) by way of a group of comparison. Social comparison thereby becomes the horizon for meaning-making.6 Rendered through the numerical form, this self-enclosed system of signification is constituted by the mathematical continuity inherent in the quantifying methods of gradation endemic to statistical analysis: it holds no referent external to the numerical form.

Through Mader’s trenchant analysis of this numerical standardization of the object as central to the unique form of biopolitical normalization, I extrapolate one step further to argue that it is also a crucially new social metric of the neoliberal episteme and its transformations of our social rationalities and practices. With social comparability provided by **statistical ratios** as a **primary lexicon** for meaning-making, we are all encouraged to **thrive** in the **endless calculations** of **maximizing** and **enhancing** afforded by this **numerical** **metric** (which is, **appropriately**, [colour-neutral] ~~colour-blind~~). Bouncing among these endlessly proliferating comparative devices, we neoliberals (stripped of meaningful social difference) are at home in a socio-psychic space that is forever aspirational and driven by many, many markets, styles, media, and trends. Neoliberal subjects internalize this calculative rationality as the perfect metric for endless self-stimulation and enhancement: it maximizes interests efficiently.

Gradually expanding across this neoliberal episteme, this economic epistemology increasingly functions as the most fitting rationality for all kinds of evaluations. We are, living in these strained neoliberal times, thereby losing hesitation about expanding the reach of this calculative rationality beyond particular kinds of objects, phenomena, and relations. The **neoliberal internalization** of the **calculative rationality** **endemic** to the economic market leads to a **transformation** in our evaluations of **all social values**. Whether the issue is **suicide rates**, **racism** or the kind of **coffee** that is ‘on-trend’, **social values begin to be determined** through the **single barometer** of this **calculative rationality** **abstracted from** and **extracted out of** any historico-social context.

This expansion of this **calculative rationality**, which functions as a social and subjective rationality in neoliberalism, intensifies the various mechanisms of liberalism, **modernity**, and global capitalism – as well as the **expansionist impulse of colonialism**. For example, it **lies at the core of the reduction of humans to cargo** that Spillers so clearly elaborates. More specifically, the **expansion** and **intensification** of this **calculative, economic epistemology** into a social and subjective rationality **transforms** the abstraction that is inherent to white European-American positions in the **anti-black colonial ontology** of liberalism, modernity, and global **capitalism**. It transforms, that is, the abstraction from the founding material violence that facilitates centuries of systemic exploitation. In order to examine this neoliberal transformation of that abstraction more precisely, I have isolated one register of it: the fresh itineraries of fungibility.

**Why answer to the summoning's of neoliberal capitalism when we can study Man2. Why accept the resolution's entrenchment of the resolution's neuro economic subject- enveloped in production and ethno-specific survival- when we can when we can warp that fantasy, opting to “[project] ourselves into an un-human future”[[2]](#footnote-2)?**

**Every expansion of Man’s order correlates with the pulverization of “aberrant” non-humans – black and indigenous life. If the topic extends Man’s sovereign scepter into everyday interaction, then what does that mean for us?**

**Voting affirmative situates habeas viscus as a refusal of the resolution’s sanctification of Man. This is a radically materialist research model that de-synchs from the rez’s humanist aspirations, tuning into liminal vibrations that contest what the econus in homo-economus is all about.**

**Weheliye 14**(Alexander G. Weheliye - professor of African American studies at Northwestern University, Habeas Viscus: Racialized Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human, pg. 135 – ERW)

Because black cultures have **frequently not had access** to **Man’s language**, **world**, **future**, or **humanity**, black studies has **developed a set of assemblages** through which to **perceive** and **understand a world** in which **subjection** is **but one path to humanity**, neither its exception nor its idealized sole fea­ture. Yet black studies, if it is to **remain critical** and **oppositional**, **cannot fall** prey to **juridical humanity** and its **concomitant pitfalls**, since this **only affects change** in the **domain of the map** but **not the territory**. In order to do so, the **hieroglyphics of the flesh** should not be **conceptualized** as just **excep­tional** or **radically particular**, since this **habitually leads** to the **comparative tabulation** of **different systems** of **oppression** that then **serve as the basis** for **defining personhood as possession**. As Frantz Fanon states: “All forms of exploitation are identical, since they apply to the same ‘object’: man.”28 Accordingly, **humans are exploited as part of the Homo sapiens species** for the **benefit of other humans**, which at the same time **yields a surplus ver­sion** of the human: **Man**. **Man** represents the **western configuration** of the **human** as **synonymous** with the **heteromasculine**, **white**, **propertied**, and **liberal subject** that **renders** all those who **do not conform** to these character­istics as **exploitable nonhumans**, literal **legal nobodies**. If we are to **affect significant systemic changes**, then we **must locate** at least some of the **strug­gles for justice** in the **region of humanity** as a **relational ontological totality** (an **object of knowledge**) that **cannot be reduced** to either the **universal** or **particular**. According to Wynter, this process requires us to recognize the “emancipation from the psychic dictates of our present... genre of being human and therefore from ‘the unbearable wrongness of being,’ of desetre, which it imposes upon ... all non-white peoples, as an imperative function of its enactment as such a mode of beingf] this emancipation had been effected at the level of the map rather than at the level of the territory.”29 The **level of the map encompasses** the **nominal inclusion** of **nonwhite subjects** in the **false universality** of **western humanity** in the wake of **radical movements** of the 1960s, while the **territory** Wynter invokes in this context, and in all of her work, is the **figure of Man** as a **racializing assemblage**. Wielding this **very particular** and **historically malleable classification** is not an **uncritical reiteration** of the **humanist episteme** or an **insistence on the exceptional particularity** of **black humanity**. Rather, **Afro-diasporic cultures** provide **singular**, **mutable**, and **contingent** figurations of the human, and thus do not represent mere bids for inclusion in or critiques of the shortcomings of western liberal humanism. The **problematic** of **humanity** however, **needs to be highlighted** as **one of the prime objects** of **knowledge** of black studies, since **not doing so** will **sustain the structures**, **discourses**, and **institutions** that **detain black life** and **thought** within the **strictures of particularity** so as to **facilitate** the **violent conflation of Man** and the **human**. Otherwise, the **general theory** of how humanity has been **lived**, **conceptualized**, **shrieked**, **hungered into being**, and **imagined** by those subjects **violently barred** from this **domain** and touched by the **hieroglyphics** of the **flesh** will **sink back** into the **deafening ocean** of **prelinguistic particularity**. This, in turn, will also render apparent that black studies, especially as it is imagined by thinkers such as Spillers and Wynter, is **engaged in engendering forms** of the **human vital** to **understanding** not only **black cultures** but **past**, **present**, and **future humanities**. As a **demonic island**, black studies **lifts the fog** that **shrouds the laws of comparison**, **particularity**, and **exception** to **reveal an aquatic outlook** “far away from **the continent of man**.”30 The poetics and politics that I have been discussing under the heading of habeas viscus or the flesh are concerned not with inclusion in reigning precincts of the status quo but, in Cedric Robinson’s apt phrasing, “the **continuing development** of a **collective consciousness** informed by the **historical struggles for liberation** and motivated by the **shared sense of obligation** to preserve [and I would add also to **reimagine**] the **collective being**, the **ontological totality**.”31 Though the laws of Man place the flesh outside the ferocious and ravenous perimeters of the legal body, habeas viscus **defies domestication** both on the basis of **particularized personhood** as a result of **suffering**, as in **human rights discourse**, and on the grounds of the **universalized version** of **western Man**. Rather, **habeas viscus** points to the **terrain of humanity** as a **relational assemblage** exterior to the **jurisdiction of law** given that the law can **bequeath** or **rescind** **ownership** of the body so that it becomes the property of proper persons but does not possess the authority to nullify the politics and poetics of the flesh found in the traditions of the oppressed. As a way of conceptualizing politics, then, habeas viscus **diverges** from the **discourses and institutions** that **yoke the flesh** to **political violence** in the **modus** of **deviance**. Instead, it **translates** the **hieroglyphics of the flesh** into a **potentiality** in any and all things, an **originating leap** in the **imagining of future anterior freedoms** and new **genres of humanity**. To envisage habeas viscus as a forceful assemblage of humanity entails le**aving behind the world of Man** and some of its **attendant humanist pieties**. As opposed to **depositing the flesh outside politics**, the **normal**, the **human**, and so on, we need a **better understanding** of its **varied workings** in order to **disrobe the cloak of Man**, which gives the human a **long-overdue extreme makeover**; or, in the words of Sylvia Wynter, “the struggle of our **new millennium** will be one between the **ongoing imperative of securing** the well-being of our **present ethnoclass** (i.e. western bourgeois) **conception of the human**, **Man**, which **overrepresents itself** as if it were the human itself, and that of securing the well-being, and therefore the **full cognitive** and **behavioral autonomy** of the **human species itself/ourselves**.”32 Claiming and **dwelling in the monstrosity** of the **flesh** present some of the **weapons in the guerrilla warfare** to “**secure the hill cognitive** and **behavioral** autonomy of the **human species**,” since these **liberate from captivity assemblages** of **life**, **thought**, and **politics** from the tradition of the oppressed and, as a result, **disfigure the centrality of Man** as the **sign for the human**. As an **assemblage of humanity**, habeas viscus **animates the elsewheres of Man** and **emancipates the true potentiality** that rests in those subjects who live behind the veil of the permanent state of exception: freedom; **assemblages of freedom** that **sway to the temporality** of **new syncopated beginnings** for the human **beyond the world** and **continent of Man**

**Against the proliferation of New Vitruvianism(s), the aff cultivates a moment of non-human diffraction that chafes up against monocultural deifications of the human – this *anti-curricula* situates theoretical inquiry not as a zone of repose, but rather, as a catalyst for lines of flight and quotidian moments of liminal affirmation.**

**Bayley 2018** (Dr. Annouchka Bayley – published several works on Posthumanism, Education and Practice-as-Research pedagogies. In 2014 she won the Warwick Award for Teaching Excellence. “Posthumanism, Decoloniality and Re-Imagining Pedagogy”. *Parallax*, Volume 24, 2018, Issue 3: Posthuman Pedagogies, Guest Edited by Annouchka Bayley and Carol, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13534645.2018.1496576> - ERW)

**The dead, white men that created Enlightenment pedagogy now find their posthumous legacy in need of an urgent re-imagining** as ‘[t]he human, social and environmental devastations induced by economic disparities and structural injustices in the access to the benefits of the global economy and its advanced technologies add another layer of violence to the contemporary world.’1 In response to this, how can ‘we’ pedagogues come to glimpse – through a glass darkly, perhaps – ways in which to **diffract ideas** about teaching and learning from across educational sectors that remain response-able to the difficult mission of **reinventing notions of what** (and who) **constitutes the human** in today’s twenty-first century world.2 As Rosi Braidotti suggests: These questions resonate across the field of posthumanities. For instance, posthuman discourses of the digital and environmental humanities, crossed with postcolonial and feminist studies, raise more urgently than ever the question of scale: how can we re-think our interconnection in the era of the Anthropocene, while re-thinking our new ecologies of belonging? The connection to the natural environment and to the technosphere of new media recasts the issue of alterity in non-human terms that cannot be adequately dealt with in the discourses and language of poststructuralist difference, let alone universalist humanism.3 Talking, thinking, moving and feeling with the urgency of Braidotti’s and other scholars’ questionings, I begin to walk in circles in my garden considering what might be involved in the creation of a ‘next step’ in pedagogy, wondering why I cannot seem to get out of this trap – literally in this moment a trap of circularity, bare feet cutting side-down into backyard grasses, marking over and over again a pathway of a borrowed shape. How performative can pedagogy be? **What kinds of runway might be paved in order to take necessary and timely ‘lines of flight’ out of here and towards possible new presents and futures**, towards a truly participatory approach to twenty-first century pedagogy?4 **What can be (un)done in the practice of teaching itself,** to invoke Gayatri Spivak, **that might decentre the circular Vitruvian-ism of our educative heritage?** How might ‘we’ Others, we teachers, we atomic and agentic ‘selves’ diffract our colonial heritages differently through pedagogy? The question is no longer simply an ‘if’ or a ‘why’ but how. Simply HOW? By diffracting this question through myself here, now, my own heritage of performance art momentarily emerges fractally. I have burnt, broken, hung, cut and bled on stage and still been no closer to the performative justice-to-come that my own cultural inheritances have craved (as a feminist Christian-Muslim-Jew in no particular order, diffracting the prism of a material-discursive ‘identity’ endlessly in-flux) to give voice to. But perhaps this act of performing selves, performing memories, performing silent and loud agential Othernesses as I have understood them from moment to moment, has come to inform an approach to teaching and learning that focuses on exactly **who and what gets a voice,** right down to an atomic level. Not just, in fact a voice, but the right to be a teacher, **the right to have one’s own myriad and spectral heritages heard.** The right to responsibly acknowledge that ‘we’ are constituted by multiple, entangled Othernesses, including nonhuman ones that are bred in the bone. Thus, emerges a momentary territorialisation as the fault lines of all my walking questions rumble and mould into shape: **Who and what teaches?** **This kind of approach diffracts the Vitruvian Man out of centre stage,** **and thus with him, diffracts the foundations of Enlightenment pedagogies.** Who or what gets to be acknowledged in the development of epistemology and its dissemination via teaching? Who or what is actually present in the creation of knowledge? **How do knowledge and being, ontology and epistemology fuse in the moment of ‘learning’ to create the very world we are studying and how do we wish to participate in that?** Asking how we might come to wish to participate agentically moves fused notions of onto-epistemology towards yet another diffraction: Karen Barad’s **onto-ethico-epistemology**. In Barad’s construction we **‘mark bodies’** as we come to know them, **scoring them and ourselves into painful and pleasurable being.** **Can we stay with this kind of trouble long enough to (un)learn?** The term onto-ethico-epistemology may be as much a mouthful to swallow for some pedagogues as it is to say, but the point is perhaps interesting and provides a challenge to current modalities shaping pedagogic practice. How might ‘we’ pedagogues interested in both decoloniality and posthumanism and where and how they might diffract practice when held together, conceive of an entanglement of ontology, epistemology and ethics? Moreover, could an understanding of teaching and learning via such an entanglement produce a state of affairs **where pedagogy becomes a site for the re-casting of the world away from Vitruvianisms?** Where justice is marked by the response-ability of a host of material-discursive phenomena finally given their agentic ‘voice’/‘space’/‘time’/‘self’. Where these become teachers of new practices, new knowledges, new performativities of human and nonhuman, new practices of decolonisation **that unravel the barbarisms of ‘Man’ and how ‘he’ has waged violence not only on minds, histories, genders, cultures and presents, but also on possible futures?** The essays that make up this Special Issue (SI) **diffract pedagogy through** such **posthuman prisms**, **speaking to and with decoloniality, vital materialism, affectivity,** post-qualitative research and a host of ambitions that come together to **trouble the theory/practice divide** in education from a position of decentring Vitruvian notions of the human. In this spirit, rather than remain solely at the level of critique each essay offers positive formulations of possible alternatives grounded in practice. In such urgent times, theory itself is not enough. We need to find practices to stay with the trouble stirred up by late capitalism in the anthropocene moment – a moment where ‘scholarship committed to the refusal if not the undoing of a world riven by new kinds of warcraft, injustice and exploitation’ requires the courage of action.5 ‘Beginning somewhere’ in the spirit of ‘one must begin somewhere’ with such a project requires that ‘we’ lay our first action carefully and thoughtfully. Indeed, as Gayatri Spivak states: If the ‘somewhere’ that one begins from is the most privileged site of a neo-colonial educational system, in an institute for training teachers, funded by the state, does that gesture of convenience not become the normative point of departure? **Does not participation in such a privileged and authoritative apparatus require the greatest vigilance?**6 Thinking through this with Donna Haraway, one might say: **it matters what matters we use to think matters with.** Thus, in order for this SI to respond response-ably to ‘our’ current moment with all its violence and creativity, how might it responsibly begin?7 Perhaps, in truth it has already begun, bound in a bright and colourful paper cover, in an edition of a journal known for its radical approach to critical theories, peer reviewed by a host of largely white, tenured academics, edited by two Western(ised) editors filtrated through years of being located, if not quite within then at least closer to, the Vitruvian position of The Academy. In a sense, in order to critically contemplate all this, this SI in actual fact, starts from somewhere in the middle with a powerfully constructed argument offered by Michalinos Zembylas. Zembylas argues for the entanglement of decoloniality and posthumanism in developing approaches to teaching and learning that ‘open up radical possibilities for both cultivating an ethics of relational ways of being and knowing and giving priority to the task of decolonisation.’8 Zembylas suggests throughout that re-thinking a posthumanist form of education must involve a tenacious awareness of just how easy it is to inadvertently ‘replac[e] one form of humanistic Higher Education with another’. Instead of falling into this trap, the author suggests a **critical vigilance** ‘that pays adequate ethical and political attention to the complex task of **dismantling the systematic and widespread linkages between humanist knowledges with coloniality’**. The article goes about this by combining the work of **Sylvia Wynter** and her consideration of reconstructions of curricula from a decolonial perspective with the work of Rosi Braidotti in her challenge to ‘the ethics, politics and epistemology of western humanism embedded in university curricula and pedagogies’, and how her approach **‘creates openings to resist the neoliberal order of higher education’.**9 Zembylas’ tone is one of impassioned caution, raising questions that are arguably vital to the creation of fully aware, posthuman approaches to pedagogy – namely, **can we pedagogues** aiming to work with posthumanism to **disentangle the academy from the proliferation of humanist Vitruvianism in all its exclusive and exclusionary guises.** Can we find ways to commit responsibly to such a project via a vital awareness of just how easy it is to slip back into humanism when decoloniality is not close to the heart of our endeavours? In service of this aim, Zembylas suggests that the two fields entangle together to ‘pluraversalise’ the task ahead.10 This challenge acts as an important cautionary tale of sorts and in the spirit of bold and critically aware beginnings (albeit from the middle – as mentioned earlier), aims to start the reader of this SI off on an important critical note: beware what you wish for – for who or what is wishing. Following Zembylas comes the offering from Asilia Franklin-Phipps and Courtney Rath. It is rare, perhaps, to find an article – and a short one at that – that truly gets one up off one’s chair with excitement. Viewpoints are designed to be just that, to offer a glimpse of the world(s) from within someone else’s vision of what justice-to-come might look like, and this article does just that with tenacity, humour and boldness. Franklin-Phipps and Rath’s polemical account urges us to stay with the trouble11 of ‘keep[ing] educational spaces safe from **the corporatizing forces of neoliberalism**, **forces that insist inclusion is a remedy for oppression,** forces that insist learning outcomes are the equivalent of knowledge, **forces that insist the intellectual freedom of scholars is less important than the comfort of those they challenge**, in the classroom and in the public.’12 **The dangers of ‘remaking children in the image of an educated (white, male, economically stable person)’ are** discussed as **a means of replicating/providing salvific futures.** In contrast to this, Donna Haraway’s notion of making kin is turned to as a form of practice, not just a theory. Indeed, the authors state unequivocally that ‘we cannot theorize teacher education differently, whilst teaching as we always have’, calling into question the separation between teaching and research in order to upend the violence that uncritical forms of pedagogy does by virtue of simply paying lip service to the idea of decoloniality. Ontological possibilities, **challenges to humanist notions of progress, widening the domain of what counts as competency,** all these things are considered brightly, passionately and urgently in the aptly titled: How to Become Less Deadly.13

#### Economic redistribution through antitrust is the perfection of terra nullius – the evacuation and clearing of Indigenous presence from the land to enable genocidal plunder.

Arruda 2016

(James, “Settler Colonialism and Mainstream Economics”, Master’s Thesis for a degree in Environmental Studies @ York University-Toronto, <http://fes.yorku.ca/files/documents/research/outstanding_papers/Arruda_J.pdf>)

A particular tragedy and contradiction in mainstream economics is its manufactured background story. The presuppositions underlying the narrative of the discipline generally mirror a biased worldview; in general, that of an isolated individual performing rational (optimizing) decisions within a closed system (Pratten, 2007; 2004). Feminist economists argue that this model individual is also white, colonial, male11 (Grappard, 1995). The story of individuals constantly taking selfish and rational decisions within a closed world informs the methodology used by economists. With a narrow experience of life, the constructed nature of existence (ontology) inscribed within mainstream economics generates unreliable knowledge production tools (epistemology) about the economy—a complex system in which collectives of individuals live and exchange with each other. Furthermore, mainstream economics epistemology employs mathematical and deductivist tools. Critical realism12 argues that economics’ deductivist methodology is only appropriate to study a ‘small-closed-world’ system (Pratten, 1996; Spash, 2012). All in all, economic event regularities are deduced from an unreasonable and unrealistic ontology. For the Cambridge Journal of Economics co-editor Stephen Pratten (2007), the only path beyond mainstream economics is through the abandonment of the deductivist framework. This is a call for a complete epistemological revolution! I believe that to delegitimize institutions, their stories have to be delegitimized. If mathematical-deduction uses prior beliefs/stories to explain the past and predict the future, then a critical reformulation of economics ontology is absolutely required as well, but not sufficient. My ontological investigation of the discipline is inspired and drawn from revolutionary Indigenous feminist theorists. For instance, in I am Woman, Lee Maracle (1996) of the Sto:Loh nation pointedly argues that (mainstream) economics and mathematics are products of white (European) settler male worldviews. As a matter of fact, the latter character’s beliefs and experiences of the world are also at the root of mainstream economics ontology, and a catalyst for its form of knowledge production. My analytical focus is also informed by my Settler space of birth occupying Kanien’kehá:ka territory. It is also informed by my present space and (white settler male) character occupying the land protected by and shared between the Anishinaabe, Mississauga, and Haudenosaunee people, as per the Dish With One Spoon treaty. In this paper, I argue that the definitions of land13, wealth and economics in Canadian mainstream economics textbooks depict a Settler colonial ontology. Thesis Land. Wealth. Economics. These three interdependent words connect how we see and act in the world. In my opinion, land is loving, abundant, intelligent, and always remembers. Land encompasses a long list of wealth; life, resources, knowledge, stories. Land is wealth. Logically and ethically, an appropriate system of wealth exchange (an economy) can only be prosperous if it respectfully relies on land. An appropriate study of economics interlaces our material relationships with each other, with more-than-humans14 and with life all together. Yet, it is not sufficient to build a better economic way to relate to the land, while Settler institutions occupy Indigenous land and territories. Different forces of power are at play within the Settler colonial complex. In general, there are three ‘structures of invasion’: spaces, systems and stories. In Settler Identity and Colonialism in 21st Century Canada, Barker and Lowman (2015) refer to these structures as they delve into the construction of Settlers in Canada. They elaborate on the types of Settler colonial invasions performed in Canada, which reinforce Settler power and authority over the land. In all instances, the spaces we15 take, the systems we build, and the stories we tell “are [ultimately] focused on the land” (Barker & Lowman, 2015, p. 31). First of all, ‘spaces’ as a structure of invasion is defined as the Settler colonial spaces that displace and replace Indigenous places (Barker et al., 2015). For example, the city of Toronto is a Settler colonial space since it intentionally covers and displaces Anishnaabe spaces. Second of all, ‘systems’ are constructed so that Settler colonialism can assert and develop itself (Barker & Lowman, 2015). The Indian Residential School system was a system that severed the ties of young Indigenous children from the land. Thirdly, the ‘stories’ created by Settlers to legitimize occupation, such as the ‘Peacemaker Myth’ and ‘Terra Nullius’, displaces Indigenous stories of land connection (Barker & Lowman, 2015). In the case of mainstream economics, the most relevant structures of invasion are the stories and systems it creates. Economic stories and systems that dismiss and replace Indigenous relations to land thus intentionally participate in the displacement and erasure of Indigenous spaces, systems and stories. Canadian economics textbooks regard land as given for free by nature (to Settlers) and (initially) without any agency16 to generate wealth, until Settlers improve and value the land. In other words, economics students assume that before the European arrival on (what is now commonly known as) North America, nature gave the land to the European Settlers—metaphorically understood, of course. All of nature’s contents was devoid of agency, and thus free for the new visitors (Settlers) to claim, to own. Completely ignoring wealth accumulation from land, the theoretical framework in Canadian economics textbooks does not question wealth distribution and mostly focuses on wealth production (see Green, 2013). Of course, wealth distribution and production occurs on land. Canadian economists nonetheless assume that all economic activities—in this case, production and distribution of wealth—begin on free and unoccupied land, transforming their respective spaces/locations (land) into improvable and privatized assets, ready for the (free) market. A Canadian definition of economics that does not encompass its socio-political (colonial) context is a structure that legitimizes Settler colonial invasion, against Indigenous peoples and their land. As such, young students who read, learn and interpret the world from Canadian economics textbooks do not face their complicity within Settler colonialism. Rather, they confidently reproduce their economic knowledge on unceded/stolen land. All in all, the underlying thesis of this chapter is that the constructed paradigm within Canadian standard economics textbooks derives from the imagination of a privileged and ahistorical Settler position of ‘objectivism’ and ‘authority’, camouflaged by Whiteness, by an empty ontology, and by storytelling derived from the dominant White Settler Male view.

**You should read this anti-curricula as a disturbance of the resolution’s traditional frame, which nevertheless creates crevices of radical dissensus. Welcome to debate’s impossible outside.**

**Kelsie 2019** (Amber E., Assistant Professor of the Practice/Associate Debate Coach at the School of Communication at Wake Forest University. PhD and MA in Communication, Media Studies, Cultural studies from the University of Pittsburgh. BA in African and African American Studies from Dartmouth University. “Blackened Debate at the End of the World” Philosophy & Rhetoric, Volume 52, Number 1, 2019, pp. 63-70)DR 19

**We are haunted by the specter of civil war.** **Liberal and conservative politicians** and commentators openly express **anxiety about the possibility of** **outright hostilities** and the “unravelling [of ] our national fabric” (Gambino 2017). **Increasing polarization**, **identity politics that destroys persuasion**, **an atmosphere of conspiracy regarding the** deep **state** or foreign puppet masters, apparent **disenchantment with institutions**, general **mistrust in electoral politics**, a gridlocked and weak congress, and **open skirmishes between white nationalist and antifascists** are put forth as signs of the end times (see, e.g., Blight 2017; Wright 2017; DeGroot 2018; Smith 2018). **The looming crisis of the end of politics** that everywhere drives **the nostalgic desire for a return to a normalcy and civility** invites us **to rethink debate and to pose a different question that does not seek to redeem a past that never was** and continues to come **at too high a cost for the wretched of the earth**. Rather than **“make debate great again,”** I’d like to **sit with the vertigo** so as **to consider debate’s (im)possible outside**. Such a quest for a horizon that is before-after-immanent to the End (of politics or history or the world) will require **that we rethink the spatiotemporal coordinates of the entire liberal project that secures the parameters of debate** as **the dialectical and agonistic contestation of the possible**. **My central interlocutor here will be blackness**: **that (non)ontological constitutive outside of the modern grammar** that is relegated to the realm of **absolute necessity**, **negativity**, **incapacity**, and **pathology** **that subtends the political and the rhetorical**. **As that which is always already outside the World**/History, **blackness provides an anoriginary nonplace** from which to think crisis and **a politics of actualizing the impossible.** **Imminent civil war is an interesting but unsurprising anxiety**; it is unsurprising because **the U.S. Civil War informs so much of the popular narrative of the United States** and **its ethical position that confirms the progressive nature of time**, and because liberal sovereignty was always a war waged against civil war.1 And it is interesting because the **Greeks referred to civil war as “stasis**.” Today standing, state, and stability are also meanings of stasis, as it emerges from histemi. **Stasis** then doubles both as sovereignty and as sovereignty’s undoing and **evokes a constant permanence of war even in peace**. Stasis in rhetorical studies takes on the meaning of “issue” and serves as **a hermeneutic for coming to consensus on the point of contention from which debate proceeds**. Stasis here also means standing **in the sense that there is some “ground” in the form of prior consensus on the nature of the disagreement**.2 The somewhat paradoxical **relationship between consensus and dissensus found in stasis speaks to a kind of disavowal of ungroundedness that** **precedes even the point from which to begin speaking**. **Must one have a presupposed potentiality for a common ground to be able to proceed in argument?** **Refusing this disavowal of groundlessness as it emerges in contemporary figurations of agonistic debate** **might enable us to more accurately think of rhetoric in its modern inflection** **as** **the presupposition of a ground as a war against its own void via antiblackness**. The inversion of Clausewitz’s proposition is salient: **rhetoric is the continuation of war by other means**; rhetoric as **a mode of war in an effort to ontologize itself against its groundless outside**.3 The (im)possible is always at stake in debate since rhetoric regards the contingent as its necessary presupposition. According to Dilip Gaonkar, this “key, but largely unnoticed, assumption in contemporary rhetorical theory” finds its basis in Aristotle’s response to Plato’s charge of the unspecifiability of rhetoric (2004, 5). Instead of freeing us to reflect explicitly on the nature of contingency, Aristotle’s domestication of rhetoric by placing rhetoric within the domain of the “contingent, yet probable” has prompted most rhetorical scholars to forgo consideration of contingency in favor of the thematic of probability: doxa, constraints, norms, ideology. Contingency in these schemas tends to be considered as a property ascribed to statements, propositions, and rhetorical acts—to the ontic world that constitutes the context of the rhetor—rather than as a mode of the subject or the singular encounter that constitutes a rhetorical situation. The possibility of **rhetorical dialectic**, **that exigency that provides the opportunity for agonistic argument** that can be sublated into judgment, **animates historical progress** and **places debate as the ground for civic life**. **In the liberal understanding of contemporary debate**, **contingency takes on an interior spatial dimension as the possible content through a disavowal of the contingency of debate’s outside that is rendered impossible. To say that debate is impossible is then to beckon to war** on the horizon. It is to recognize the state of emergency as **the end of the state of debate. The historical legacy** of the U.S. Civil War **will not let us end it there however**, **because blackness haunts even civil war**, **and threatens stasis in both its senses with incoherence**. To leave raciality by the wayside is **to repeat the endless disavowal that what we are threatened with is civil war and not race war.** It is **to still recuperate this World though the dialectical resolution that can adjust antagonism to agonism**. **It is to wage liberal sovereignty’s war against civil war all over again.** **Polite discussions that acknowledge racial terror only so as to explain away racial violence** as the unique domain of extremists **maintain a sense of white innocence that not only individuates a structural condition**, **but also pathologizes and prohibits black utterance** (especially when that utterance might take on the form of rage) **by adjusting the impossible demands of blackness back to the acceptable terms of debate**. **Within such discussions, blackness can only appear as an afterthought**, as what Denise Ferreira da Silva terms the affectable I or outer-determined rather than self-determined subject in the onto-epistemological modern text (da Silva 2007). **Raciality is intrinsic to modernity because it is necessary for the construction of the Subject**—it names the materialization of the spatiotemporal forms that make the modern grammar. It creates the grounds for the self-determined subject. For da Silva, **nothing short of a fracturing of the spatiotemporal formal principles of understanding** that subtend historical and scientific knowledge **will redress the totality of racial violence**, especially as it concerns black folk. Let us then take seriously Du Bois’s insight into the actual U.S. Civil War that animates so many antiblack pathologies today: that **it was the black slaves**, not Lincoln nor the Union, **who won the war**; **and that it was the slaves**, and not the South, **who ultimately lost. For it was in the chaos and crisis of civil war that fugitivity realized freedom only to have it snatched away in Reconstruction**: “The slave went free; stood a brief moment in the sun; then moved back again toward slavery. . . . Democracy died save in the hearts of black folk” (Du Bois 1935, 30). In Black Reconstruction, we are gifted a tale of the violence of antiblack dialectic and the potential of black fugitivity. The common narrative that the North fought a war to end slavery and to preserve the Union figures the U.S. Civil War as a political battle concerning sovereignty and succession, or in the radical imagination as a battle for the future of capital between an industrial North and a pastoral planter economy in the South. **For Du Bois this cannot be the** whole or even essential part of the **story**, as **both narratives naturalize the position of the slave** and her nominal emancipation as derivative rather than active. In Du Bois’s account, **black liberation was never the terms on which the war was fought**; **the war was fought over competing concerns to limit the competition that black people posed to whites**, both as slave labor and as free labor. **The North for its part desired neither the abolition of slavery nor its expansion** into the western territories. **Northerners desired a resolution to an untenable status quo thrown into disequilibrium by competing visions for how best to subjugate the black population** to secure the white settlerist way of life. **It was not until the slaves, through the waging of the General Strike**, **showed the North the way to win the war that Lincoln reluctantly issued the Emancipation Proclamation** (Du Bois 1935, 82). **The General Strike was the moment in which the impossible was actualized**, through **an incisive refusal to continue under the terms presented**: “This was **not merely the desire to stop work**. It was **a strike on a wide basis against the conditions of work**. It was a general strike that involved directly in the end perhaps a half million people. **They wanted to stop the economy of the plantation system, and to do that they left the plantations**” (Du Bois 1935, 68). Significantly, Du Bois’s analysis of the Civil War extends beyond the Confederacy’s surrender in 1865 to the end of Reconstruction and the beginning of Jim Crow in 1878. The democracy to come was quickly sealed off in the compromises made between the North and the South that we call **Reconstruction**. Here **debate**, **both as contestation on common ground and as the resolution to war**, **could only re-elaborate black suffering through nominal emancipation**. In Reconstruction we witness how **the bargain was struck for a newly transformed American whiteness** produced through the sublation of the “Southern way of life” (the fantasy of which still animates grievances on the Right), but **against black life**. **The reinstantiation of master-slave relationships** in confederate amnesty, **black codes**, the **Thirteenth Amendment**, **vagrancy laws**, **convict leasing**, **extralegal terror**, **and** **the ongoing sentimental and material expropriation of total value from the slave that sustains global capital constitutes the emergence of the “afterlife of slavery”** that characterizes our present (Hartman 1997). Du Bois’s analysis disrupts the spatiotemporal coordinates of the political to think the (im)possibility of black politics and liberation. **To think** with and **through blackness means that we cannot think the Civil War as a demarcated event** **distinct from Reconstruction and Jim Crow**, or think the stasis of contestation between the divisions of a polity. **We must abandon the liberal notion of progress that “accumulates . . . [and] . . . captures” black suffering in the name of securing an antiblack future** as well as the appeal of universality and particularity which spatially “arrests Blackness’s creative potential” (Dillon 2013, 42; da Silva 2014, 84). According to da Silva, “such an understanding of total value [of slavery for the creation of the World] requires a suspension of the view that all there is is in Time and Space . . . **the radical force of Blackness lies at the turn of thought—that is, Blackness knowing and studying announces the End of the World as we know it”** (2014, 84, emphasis mine). Da Silva joins a growing number of black scholars in many different disciplinary homes thinking through the metaphysics of blackness as that which is ungrounded and ontologically null with respect to the modern onto-epistemological paradigm.4 In the World that ontologizes antiblackness and racial capitalism, the calculus of racial terror exceeds and makes possible recognition through the reduction of blackness to the figure of the Slave. The middle passage here is metonymic, naming the production of anagrammatical blackness through the ongoing logistic of being captured and shipped, **that reduces blackness from body to flesh, “that zero degree of social conceptualization that does not escape concealment under the brush of discourse” (Sharpe 2016; Spillers 1987, 67).** **Such a proposition returns raciality, specifically blackness and antiblackness, to the analysis of what grounds debate’s (im)possibility.** **What would it mean to think debate as a praxis of the impossible?** To think **a blackened debate not as the presupposition of a ground through approximation to an antiblack human** genre of Man, the Subject or the transparent I, **but as** Harney and Moten say, “jurisgenerative **black social life”** (2017, 15)? **We would need to rethink** **the** cherished **terms of rhetoric itself**. **We might think debate not as dialectic that both precedes and proceeds from stasis**, **but as the refusal of “the call to order” that opens up black forms of life**, even as form is placed under erasure (Halberstam 2013, 9). **From this vantage point of blackness**, which is not really a vantage point at all, but **a being out of place and time**, **of Being under erasure in the condition of mutual dispossession**, **we might begin to sketch other visions that deactivate rhetoric’s ontologizing premises**, to hold for a moment, **in the hold and in the wake**, not grounded but oceanic movement, decay and life, where even dead things become something else. It is here and happening all the time in the marooned spaces of the world. **In studying debate’s (im)possibility, we might theorize at the End of the World as a praxis oriented toward its abolition.**

# 2AC

# 1AR

### 1AR ⁠— AT: Antitrust Good

#### 1---their justification for antitrust is to…

**Davis et al., 2021**

(Joshua P. Davis et. al, Professor and Director, March, “Antitrust as Antiracism: Antitrust as a Partial Cure for Systemic Racism", University of San Francisco Law Research Paper, accessed 9/17/2021,VC)

Antitrust litigation may provide a valuable tool in dismantling systemic racism. In that regard, it holds some advantages over antidiscrimination litigation. Antitrust laws: 1. are designed to assess entire systems, 2. take into account capital and not just income, 3. can compare the allocation of money between workers and owners—apples and oranges—and not just workers and workers—apples, 4. can expand the financial pie available to all workers rather than reallocate the slices, and 5. appeal to centrist free market principles. None of this is to say that antitrust litigation is more effective than antidiscrimination litigation at combatting systemic racism, much less that one should displace the other. Our points are more modest. They are that antitrust law has a role to play in promoting racial justice and that the design of antitrust law confers important advantages in that effort. This essay also may raise some questions in the inquisitive reader. Why is it that antitrust law has the advantages it does over antidiscrimination law? Legislators and courts might be able to formulate antidiscrimination doctrine to focus more on entire markets and other systems and less on discrete employers or individual actors. They might be able to tackle the unjust exploitation of workers by capital. They might be able to assess how money is allocated between employers and workers. They might increase the pie for all workers. They might appeal to principles that benefit not just workers of color and other protected groups but all workers. Perhaps there are sound reasons antidiscrimination law is not designed in that way. Perhaps not. At the least, antitrust law provides a useful contrast and comparison.

1. McKittrick 2015 (Katherine McKittrick – Professor in Gender Studies and the Graduate Program in Cultural Studies, Black Studies, Cultural Geographies, The Arts (music, fiction, poetry, visual art), Theories of Race, and Interdisciplinarity at University of Queens. “Sylvia Wynter: On Being Human as a Praxis”, Duke University Press, pp. 9-10 [starting at “This conversation should be read with Wynter’s …” to “lives of all humans are increasingly subordinated to a figure that thrives on accumulation.”] – ERW/BEH) [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)